<--Retour à la liste des gagnants / Return to Essays 1999-2000

Fortune in the Third Book of Horaceís Odes

by

Jim Grant
(Queen's University)

The theme of fortune pervades the third book of Horaceís Odes.  Two general conceptions of fortune emerge:  the notion of fortune as an orderly force (providence) and the notion of fortune as a random force (chance).  The poet also develops a way of dealing with fortune, consisting of simple living, virtue and leisure.  The importance of fortune as a theme is indicated by Carm. 3.29, which, as Santirocco points out, ìstand[s] apart from the preceding sequenceî as an epilogue. [1]  In it, the poet describes the nature of fortune and how one should respond to it.  Analysis indicates that much of the book does the same thing.  In particular, the bookís presentation of leisure, though apparently unrelated to fortune, is in fact closely tied to the problem of fortune.

        When fortune appears as provident, the universe is portrayed as rationally ordered and as just.  The book opens with a picture of a hierarchically arranged universe, in which kings rule over their own flocks, but reges in ipsos imperium est Iovis.[2] Imperium, with its double connotation of rule and of order, further establishes that the power to which kings are subject is itself orderly.  The fourth ode quite decisively states that nothing falls outside Juppiterís imperium:  land and sea, living and dead, gods and mortals alike are beneath him. (Carm. 3.4.45-48).  Juppiter protects the universe against the forces of disorder, symbolized in both the first and fourth odes by the Giants. [3]  He and the other Olympians, who odere viris / omne nefas animo moventis (Carm. 3.4.66-68), ensure that vice and hubris are punished.  The victims of the godsí wrath in Carm. 3.4 include not only those who, like the Giants, are characterized by intemperate violence, but also those who, like Tityos, Orion and Pirithous, are characterized by lust. [4]  Juno in the third ode accounts for Troyís fortune in moral terms:  Paris was incestus in judging Venus most beautiful, Helen was adultera, and the whole house of Priam was periura because of Laomedonís cheating of the gods (Carm. 3.3.19-24.).  Rome, in turn, must not defy the will of the gods by rebuilding Troy (Carm. 3.3.57-68): her success depends, as the sixth ode states, upon constant awareness of her subordinate position in the universe (Carm. 3.6.5-6).

        Chance, by contrast, is chaotic and unpredictable.  Soon after the picture of universal order in the first ode, the poet likens our fates to a group of names drawn by lot from a jar (Carm. 3.1.9-16).  Fickle public opinion, disdainfully described as ìthe popular breath,î is a further instance of fortuneís randomness (Carm. 3.2.17-20).  Chance even enters into what is represented as an example of providence - the punishment of vice - since Juppiter often makes the innocent share the criminalís lot if they happen to be in the criminalís presence (Carm. 3.2.26-30).  In Carm. 3.29, the images of a flood sweeping up everything in its path and of a storm sinking a ship (33-41) illustrate the principle that lines 49-50 state directly: [5]Fortuna is sadistic, dealing with human life as though it were a game.

        This is not to say, however, that chance merely torments us in random ways.  By times, as 3.29 goes on to say, it is actually kind, at other times cruel (Carm. 3.29.51-52).  This fact, symbolized by the wheel in Carm. 3.10.10, is illustrated throughout the book.  The suddenness of the change of the gentle river into a flood in 3.29 is conveyed by compressing the description of the river and the flood into one continuous sentence and by the anaphora nunc . . . nunc (Carm. 3.29.33-41).  In counselling Europe to learn bene ferre magnam . . . fortunam, Venus tells her that as a result of the kidnapping which so upsets her, a continent will be named for her (Carm. 3.27.74-76).  Horace makes a point to describe the vitality of the animals about to be slaughtered in Carm. 3.13 and Carm. 3.22:  the good fortune of the goat, destined for love and for battle (Carm. 3.13.5), and of the boar, ìpractising its sidelong slash,î [6] will take a dramatic turn of which they are ignorant (Carm. 3.13.6-8, 3.22.6-8).  Though one may know that chance operates like a wheel, one cannot know whether one will receive good fortune or ill at the next moment; unlike the conception of fortune as provident, in which it is at least predictable that evil will be punished (cf. Carm. 3.2.31-32), the conception of fortune as chance considers the future shrouded in caliginosa nocte (Carm. 3.29.30).

        The problem of fortune is, of course, how one can be happy given that the universe is governed by fortune (in some form) and not by oneself.  Horaceís response to the problem of fortune - simple living, virtue, and leisure [7] ---is meant to preserve happiness whether fortune proves to be provident or random.  Interestingly, Horaceís response does not depend on a reconciliation of these two conceptions of fortune.  The poet does not, for example, take all apparently random events in the odes, explain them in terms of providential order, and develop a philosophy of life on that basis.  Though he does state (Carm. 3.4.9-28) that his protection from disaster was due to the Muses in Carm. 3.4 and may be implying in Carm. 3.8.6-8 that Bacchus protected him, these statements are not developed.  Moreover, the solution that is developed is unaffected by the success of this reconciliation.

        Simple living is a response both to providence and to chance.  If fortune is provident, the one who lives simply will be rewarded by the gods, for quanto quisque sibi plura negaverit, / ab dis plura feret. . .. (Carm. 3.16.21-22).  Horace assures Phidyle (whose name is derived from the Greek verb for being economical [8]) that the gods will protect the crops from disaster (Carm. 3.23.1-8).  The Penates are pleased to receive sacrifice even of the salt and meal placed on a normal sacrificial victimís head. [9]

        If, on the other hand, fortune is random, then simple living is eminently practical.  It reduces the likelihood of encountering bad fortune.  The merchant and sailors described in Carm. 3.24 are willing to risk their lives in the deserts, in the Arctic regions, and in violent storms on the sea simply because they consider poverty a disgrace. [10]  If one encounters bad fortune nevertheless, then simple living minimizes the damage.  In another image of a stormy sea, in Carm. 3.29, Horace contrasts himself with those who would fall on their knees begging the gods to save their riches from the storm (Carm. 3.29.57-64).  He, who courts pauperies sine dote when good fortune abandons him (Carm. 3.29.53-56), would only concern himself with saving his life. [11]

        Like simplicity, virtue allows one to obtain happiness in the face of both providence and chance.  As noted, the gods punish vice when fortune is provident, and so virtue is a prudent course of action.  The gods provide rewards in this life (for they advance the goals of the one who uses vis temperata, Carm. 3.4.66-67), and to the very virtuous, who are immeriti mori, they even provide immortality (Carm. 3.2.21-22, 3.3.1-16), which Horace predicts will be Augustusís fate on account of his exemplary justice and fortitude (Carm. 3.3.1-12).

            Virtue successfully responds to the problem of chance for two reasons.  First, being unaffected by changes of fortune, it provides a stable basis for happiness. [12]  In Carm. 3.29, Horace explains that when good fortune abandons him, he gives up what she has given him and ìwraps himselfî in virtue (Carm. 3.29.53-56).  Horaceís encomium for the virtuous man in Carm. 3.3 underscores the stability provided by virtue in the face of fortune:  such a one can endure the complaints of the depraved citizens, the gaze of the tyrant, the storm of the Adriatic, the hand of Juppiter himself, and the destruction of the world with a mente solida (Carm. 3.3.1-8).  The seventh ode portrays the lovers Asterie and Gyges, the victims of an unfortunate separation, and Horaceís advice to Asterie again appeals to stability:  remain virtuous, as faithful to Gyges, the constantis iuvenem fide (Carm. 3.7.4), as he has been to you (Carm. 3.7.9-32).  Virtue even allows one to flourish in death, the worst circumstance fortune can muster against a person.  Since mors et fugacem persequitur virum, one might as well face it bravely and patriotically:  it then becomes dulce et decorum (Carm. 3.2.13-14).

        The second reason that virtue is an answer to the problem of chance is that virtue actually minimizes the damage that chance can do (much as simplicity keeps one out of danger).  In the sixth ode, Horace identifies irreverence for marriage, family and the home as the source of clades (Carm. 3.6.17-20).  The effect of such vices on the national character would have prevented Romeís ancestors from winning their greatest battles (Carm. 3.6.21-44.); in Horaceís own age, they nearly caused Romeís downfall. [13]  As Regulus sees, Rome will be more vulnerable to pernicies if a brave army is not available, and so he urges the senate not to suggest, by ransoming prisoners, that surrender in war is morally neutral (Carm. 3.5.5-30).  In Carm. 3.14, Augustus appears as the paragon of the virtuous man making society less vulnerable to pernicies.  Returning from Spain, he is likened to Hercules, another famous benefactor of humanity.[14]  Horace reflects that, because of Augustusís achievement, he no longer needs to fear tumultus or mori per vim (Carm. 3.14.13-16).  He immediately bids his slave seek ointment, flowers, wine and a girl (Carm. 3.14.17-21).  Civil peace, made possible by virtue, allows Horace leisure.

        That leisure is a prominent theme in the odes clearly suggests that Horace did not regard simplicity and virtue as sufficient for a happy life in themselves.  Certainly, as Carm. 3.29.53-56 makes clear, simplicity and virtue have the power to preserve happiness in the event of bad fortune; however, as was observed above, they also tend to allow good fortune to occur.  What constitutes happiness then?  Leisure is necessary, and in the third book of the Odes, the leisures specifically recommended are love, parties and relaxation in the countryside.

        At this point, however, an objection should be answered.  It may appear that incorporating leisure into an analysis of fortune in Horace is straying from the topic.  The connection between, on the one hand, most odes of the third book that celebrate leisure and, on the other hand, the theme of fortune, is perhaps not obvious at first sight.  Granted, in Carm. 3.29, Horace clearly presents leisure as an answer to fortune.  The explicit reflection on fortune is preceded by a lengthy appeal to Maecenas to leave aside his civic concerns and join Horace in the countryside for dinner (Carm. 3.29.1-28).  In itself, an appeal of this sort has no necessary connection with the problem of fortune.  However, Horace relates it to fortune in 3.29 by making the reader conscious of time.  The opening of the poem is structured by a pattern of contrasting images:  lines 1-5 describe the joys of leisure, 5-12 contrast the stresses of Maecenasís life, 13-24 the joys of leisure, and 25-28 Maecenasís stresses.  Significantly, the reflection on time comes next - exactly where one would expect a description of the joys of leisure.  What has occurred is clear:  Horace twice tries to persuade Maecenas to join him by using ësuperficialí reasons (pleasure is presented as obviously preferable to stress); then, perhaps because the dutiful Maecenas, in the dramatic context of the poem, remains unpersuaded, Horace decides to justify leisure at greater length and on a more intellectual basis.  This basis is the nature of time and of fortune.  We have no knowledge of the future, and so can only concern ourselves with quod adest (Carm. 3.29.29-33).  The problems that concern Maecenas---the Chinese, Bactria, the Tanais---are far off, and hardly relevant to the present moment. [15]  Fortune will carry away the future (cetera) like a river, and it may be like a peaceful stream or like a flood (Carm. 3.29.33-41)---but we cannot know which.  Therefore, as Horace famously states in the first book, carpe diem quam minimum credula postero [16].  The one cui licet in diem / dixisse ëvixií (Carm. 3.29.42-43.) will live happily:  rather than ruining each moment with fear over what is to come (Carm. 3.29.43-45), he will use what he can to some degree control---the present---to maximize his happiness.  If fortune stays in that present moment, one should seize the opportunity to praise her (see Carm. 3.29.53); from the context of Carm. 3.29, it is clear that such praise is leisure.[17]

        However, the objection might conclude, the fact that leisure is celebrated in other odes does not mean that it is there presented as a solution to the problem of fortune.  Horace may simply be celebrating leisure on other grounds (such as the superficial grounds he initially presents to Maecenas in Carm. 3.29), and not intend these celebrations to be read in the context of the problem of fortune.

        To this objection, two responses may be given.  First, the prominent position of Carm. 3.29 makes it reasonable to suppose that themes in it have a bearing on the rest of the book.[18]  In that ode, the poet teaches the connection between leisure and fortune by explanation, but one can teach such a theme, particularly in literature, by illustration as well.  Numerous ëleisure odesí appear merely to illustrate leisure (e.g., Carm. 3.18, 3.21, 3.28).  When read in light of 3.29, such illustrations acquire deeper significance: Horace has elsewhere reflected upon the problem of fortune, and is now displaying his solution.[19]  Second, there is evidence that many leisure odes are not, in fact, ëmere illustrationsí whose only link to the problem of fortune is the fact they share the theme of leisure with 3.29.  The key to understanding them in the context of the problem of fortune is to observe the motif of time and, in particular, of death that pervades them.

        In the first love poems of book three, there are several allusions to death and to the brevity of life.  In the ninth ode, Horace and Lydia are no longer young.[20]  Horace contrasts himself with Calais, the iuvenis whom Lydia now loves (Carm. 3.9.1-3.), and she herself describes Calais as a puer (Carm. 3.9.16).  They tell each other that they would be willing to die for their new lovers if the fates will allow them to do so (Carm. 3.9.12, 16).  This, of course, may be merely a cliché of love poetry.  The final line, however, by its prominent position and sudden change of Lydiaís tone, highlights mortality as a dominant concern.  Lydia tells Horace:

    quamquam sidere pulchrior
[Calais] est, tu levior cortice et improbo
    iracundior Hadria,
tecum vivere amem, tecum obeam libens. (Carm. 3.9.21-24)

This suggests that they are looking for stable companionship as death---potentially a lonely death---becomes more vivid to them.

        The poet in the tenth ode pleads with Lyce to accept his wooing (Carm. 3.10.1-4).  He warns her to put aside her pride that displeases Venus, ne currente retro funis eat rota (Carm. 3.10.9-10).  The wheel of fortune is not likely to turn favorably for a woman who disdains love:  with her husband unfaithful, she should hear the appeals of her suitors while they still remain (Carm. 3.10.13-17), lest she lose them in addition to her husband.  The poet warns that he will not always put up with her rejection (Carm. 3.10.19-20).  This warning suggests that, unlike Lyce, he is acutely aware of the passage of time.  He will not wait for her to ìspare the livesî[21] of her suitors before he can say ëvixi.í

          Similarly, in the eleventh ode Lyde is warned to love in order to escape misfortune.  Lyde has been reluctant to begin a relationship with Horace (Carm. 3.11.7-12).  To persuade her, the poet asks Mercury to threaten her with the story of the punishment in Hades of Danausís daughters, who murdered their husbands (Carm. 3.11.25-29).  This seems unusual, for Lyde and the daughters of Danaus appear to have little in common.  However, the threat makes sense if Lydeís rejection of Horace is represented as a kind of murder that will be followed by unfortunate consequences for her.  What are these consequences?  Unlike in Carm. 3.9 and possibly Carm. 3.10, actually dying alone is probably not one of them (for the young Lyde is not even married yet).  The misfortune of being unloved, however, is likened to the misfortune of death in Horaceís own case by the murder analogy.  Now, murderers also go to Hades, and there suffer more than their victims.  Following the parallel, then, it seems that Lydeís reluctance will result in her being unloved as well, and the pain will be greater for her.  Hypermestra, whose example Horace wants Lyde to follow, is twice described as having escaped mortality through the fame that her good deed of saving her husband brought her (Carm. 3.11.35-36, 51-52).  The parallel holds:  the cognate way for Lyde to ësaveí Horace is to begin a relationship with him; thus can she escape the ëdeathí of being unloved.

        Allusions to the passage of time in odes celebrating parties indicate their connection to the carpe diem response to fortune.  As Santirocco points out, the ìseason and occasion [of the parties] are fixed with far greater precisionî in book three than in the other books.[22]  The image of dira Necessitas driving nails into the buildings of the rich in Carm. 3.24.1-8 is a useful preface to a discussion of time in these odes.  Williams comments that this image symbolizes Death putting an end to human efforts, and evokes the Roman custom of the pontifex maximus driving a nail into a wall to mark the end of a year; ìthat is why the poet has armed Death with nails---she marks the end of the manís life.î[23]  Given that a fixed date appears so often in the party odes, it is illuminating to see that the completion of a year brings to Horaceís mind the completion of life.

      Carm. 3.8 is set on the Matronalia,[24] but it is Horaceís own private holiday because of his escape from bad luck:  he was prope funeratus / arboris ictu on this date, and, true to his declaration that he praises fortune when she stays, he promised Bacchus that he would feast on every Matronalia thereafter (Carm. 3.8.6-8).  After again drawing attention to the fact that it is a dies anno redeunte (Carm. 3.8.9), he urges Maecenas to join in the leisure in a manner similar to the ësuperficialí appeal of Carm. 3.29 (Carm. 3.8.13-24).  He ends with a concise version of his reflections on time in 3.29: dona praesentis cape laetus horae: / linque severa (Carm. 3.8.27-28).

        The seventeenth and nineteenth odes both open with mockery of genealogy,[25] an appropriate ìmoral subordinationî of the past since it is followed in both by preparations to celebrate in the present.[26]  As when he advises Maecenas to enjoy the pleasures of the present, Horace makes Telephus in 3.19 see that a girl is in love with him.[27]  Horaceís very hurried tone in the middle of the poem, as he orders what needs to be done for the party to succeed (Carm. 3.19.9-11, 18-24), shows his anxiety not to waste a moment.  The date, too, is significant:  it is the eve of the new year when Murena will enter the college of augurs.[28]  In 3.17, Aeliusí birthday is the occasion for the party.[29]  Moreover, they are to celebrate sheltered from a coming storm (Carm. 3.17.9-16), and as noted, the storm is a frequent symbol in the odes for the devastating effects of fortune (Carm. 3.1.25-32, 3.2.26-29, 3.3.1-5, 3.4.28-31, 3.7.5, 3.24.40-41, 3.27.17-24, 3.29.57-64, and 3.30.1-4).

          Finally, Carm. 3.28, set on the Neptunalia,[30] is a brief but concentrated exhortation to celebrate, again motivated by consciousness of the brevity of life.  Lyde, ordered like a soldier with the word strenua to get the wine,[31] is made to observe ìthat the midday is declining.î[32]  As Williams points out,[33] this is both an oddly precise phrase and a departure from the usual observation that the day is declining.  This suggests that ìmiddayî may have symbolic meaning.  It would be an appropriate symbol for Horaceís own life, as he would have been about forty-one years old - past middle-age - when the Odes were published.  The poet further chastises Lydeís hesitation by saying she acts veluti stet volucris dies (Carm. 3.28.6):  she does not realize how quickly they are losing time for celebration and love.[34]

        Relaxation in the countryside, while providing the background to several odes, comes to the fore in Carm. 3.13, 3.18, and 3.22.  Death and the passage of time remain concerns.  The thirteenth and eighteenth odes continue to provide precise dates for their settings (the day before the Fontinalia, and the Faunalia, respectively).[35]  The thirteenth odeís otherwise tranquil praise of the fons Bandusiae is strikingly interrupted by the portrait of the goat ready for life but---frustra---about to be slaughtered (Carm. 3.13.3-8).  Interestingly, love, a subject treated in the four odes preceding Carm. 3.13 and in the two odes following, is among the goatís destinies that this stroke of fortune will deny him (Carm. 3.13.5-6).  The eighteenth ode illustrates at length the rural beauty that Carm. 3.29 presents to Maecenas.  The fact that another year has passed is explicitly acknowledged, and is linguistically interwoven with the death of the sacrificial victim: tener pleno cadit haedus anno (Carm. 3.18.5).  Death is also present in Carm. 3.22, the short dedication of a pine tree by Horaceís farmhouse to the rural goddess Diana.  The vigorous sacrificial victim again is shown with pathos (Carm. 3.22.7).  Diana is praised as the one who takes girls in childbirth away from death (Carm. 3.22.2-3).  Death is particularly prominent if the dedication is related to Horaceís having been struck by a tree (as mentioned in Carm. 3.8).  This would explain why he is laetus to make an annual sacrifice to the goddess (Carm. 3.22.6-8):  as in Carm. 3.8, he is praising fortune in his personal festival for staying with him.  Finally, though a precise date is not mentioned, the poet swears that he will happily sacrifice per . . . exactos annos (Carm. 3.22.6)---another unusual statement for the type of poem, for, as Williams notes, hunters would not ìguarantee a certain type of kill, yearly, on a specified dayî[36] in a dedication.  It would make sense, however, if a theme deeper than a simple dedicatory offering (such as consciousness of mortality and gratitude at having survived another year) is at work in the poem.

            In short, associating the leisure odes with the problem of fortune answers numerous questions about them.  Why is death a background to love and nature poetry?  Why does haste to get things done recur in the party odes?  Why does Horace start making the reader conscious of precise dates in the third book?  The subject matter of none requires these elements, but the effect in each is the same:  to convey a sense that the good fortune allowing one to enjoy leisure is transient.  The presence of this effect, used in Carm.3.29 to link leisure with the problem of fortune, suggests that Horace is using the same strategy in the other leisure odes.

            The logic of Horaceís approach to fortune is thus clear.  If fortune is provident, simplicity and virtue are rewarded by good fortune.  If fortune is random, simplicity and virtue preserve as much happiness as possible when bad fortune occurs, and increase oneís chances of good fortune.  Good fortune, being precious in a universe governed by chance, must be exploited to the full.  It is of no avail to be pre-occupied by the past (like Telephus) or by the future (like Maecenas):  one must enjoy leisure now.  To reject it, as Lyce, Lyde, and Maecenas want to do, indicates ignorance of fortuneís capriciousness.  Horace has no illusions about fortune, but traces a path to happiness in the third book of the Odes nonetheless.
 

 


Endnotes

1. Matthew S. Santirocco, Unity and Design in Horaceís Odes (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986) 149.  <Back>

2. Horace, The Third Book of Horaceís Odes, ed. Gordon Williams (Oxford: Clarendon, 1969) Carm. 3.1.5-8.  All note references to the text of the odes are from Williamsís edition unless otherwise indicated.  <Back>

3. Horace Carm. 3.1.7, Carm. 3.4.49-80; Eduard Fraenkel, Horace (Oxford: Clarendon, 1957) 282, and Horace, ed. Williams 54.  <Back>

4. Horace, Carminum Libri IV, Epodon Liber, ed. T. E. Page (London:  Macmillan, 1895) 322. <Back>

5. Ross S. Kilpatrick, lecture on Horace, Carm. 3.29, Watson Hall, Kingston (99 11 05). <Back>

6. Horace Carm. 3.22.7, Williamsís translation (Horace, ed. Williams 117).  <Back>

7.  There is an interesting correspondence between the simple living-virtue-leisure scheme of solutions and the peasant-soldier-poet scheme of states of life that Horace develops and praises in Carm. 1.1 (as these states are analysed by Jean-Marie André, LíOtium dans la Vie Morale et Intellectuelle Romaine:  Des Origines à LíEpoque Augustéenne (Paris:  Presses Universitaires de France, 1966) 464-467).  The peasant corresponds to simplicity (cf. Carm. 3.1, 3.23, 3.29), the soldier to virtue (cf. Carm. 3.2, 3.5, 3.6), and the poet to leisure (cf. Carm. 3.19, 3.25, 3.26).  Moreover, the ranking Horace gives these states of life (as elucidated at André 467) mirrors the ranking he gives their corresponding solutions to the problem of fortune.  André notes that the states of life are presented ìin an increasing order of dignityî from peasant to soldier to poet (467).  This corresponds to the structure of Horaceís solutions as developed in the third book of the Odes:  simple living is the foundation on which the other two solutions are built (for the connection between simplicity and virtue, see Carm. 3.24, where the nomadic Scythians and Getae are presented as models of monogamy and of parental love; for the connection between simplicity and leisure, see Carm. 3.1, where the dominus, because of his wealth, is attended even on his yacht by Timor, Minae, and atra Cura); virtue, in turn, is a pre-condition of leisure (cf. Carm. 3.14 and the commentary on it on p. 5, above).  Moreover, simple living and virtue are not enough for happiness (see p. 5 ff., above), for in the event of good fortune one must pursue leisure ñ giving leisure a pride of place as a solution analogous to that given the poet as a state of life. <Back>

8. Horace, ed. Williams 120; Santirocco 138.  <Back>

9. Carm. 3.23.17-20; Horace, ed. Page 371.  <Back>

10. Carm. 3.24.36-44; Horace, ed. Williams 127.  <Back>

11. Carm. 3.29.62-64; Kilpatrick lecture (99 11 05).  Pollux is mentioned here as guiding Horace to safety, and so one might conclude that this is an illustration of provident fortune.  However, the point Horace makes ñ that the simple man would be concerned about his own safety rather than his possessions in bad fortune ñ remains a practical incentive for pursuing the simple life even if fortune is random and Pollux would not have guided him to safety.  Moreover, Horace does not state that Pollux would do so as a reward for living simply, and so it is doubtful that Horace is here promoting the simple life on account of a divine protection that he claims for it. <Back>

12.  Ross S. Kilpatrick, lecture on Horace, Carm. 3.29, Watson Hall, Kingston (99 11 08); Ross S. Kilpatrick, ìFortuna Regum:  A 17th-Century Allegorical Landscape at Queenís University,î International Journal of the Classical Tradition 3 (Summer 1996) 69, where Horaceís view of virtue and fortune is illustrated by a quotation from Seneca:  Nihil eripit fortuna, nisi quod dedit:  virtutem autem non dat (De Const. Sap. 5.2).  Cf. also Carm. 3.2.17-20. <Back>

13. Carm. 3.6.9-16; cf. Horace, ed. Williams 63, where Williams comments that such civil strife was due to lack of domestic virtue as well as the impiety noted in lines 1-8.  <Back>

14. Carm. 3.14.1-4; Horace, ed. Williams 92. <Back>

15. Carm. 3.29.25-28; cf. Horace, ed. Williams 147-148.  <Back>

16.  Horace, ed. Page Carm. 1.11.8. <Back>

17. André (489) supports the view that leisure is presented as a solution to the problem of fortune in this ode by noting that tying ìan allusion to the omnipotence of Fortunaî with leisure ìwould not make sense if one did not recall that Hellenistic thought, and Epicurianism in particular, found in the dogma of [tyche] the justification for a certain passivity. . . .î  <Back>

18. Cf. Kilpatrick lecture (99 11 08). <Back>

19. See Santiroccoís comment on this sort of interpretation with reference to Carm. 3.17-19, at Santirocco 136. <Back>

20. Ross S. Kilpatrick, lecture on Horace, Carm. 3.9, Watson Hall, Kingston (99 10 06). <Back>

21. Horace, Carm. 3.10.16-17, Williamsí translation (Horace, ed. Williams 77).  <Back>

22. Santirocco 133.  <Back>

23. Horace, ed. Williams 125-126. <Back>

24. Carm. 3.8.1; Horace, ed. Williams 72.  <Back>

25. Carm. 3.17.1-9 (cf. Horace, ed. Williams 104, where it is noted that the honorific address to Aelius is actually crediting him with descent from a tribe of cannibals); Horace, Carm. 3.19.1-8. <Back>

26. Santirocco 134.   <Back>

27. Carm. 3.19.25-27; cf. Horace, ed. Williams 111. <Back>

28. Horace, ed. Williams 110.  <Back>

29. Carm. 3.17.14-15; cf. Horace, ed. Williams 105.  <Back>

30. Carm.3.28.1-2; cf. Horace, ed. Williams 142.  <Back>

31. Carm. 3.28.3; cf. Horace, ed. Williams 143. <Back>

32. Carm. 3.28.5-6, Williamsís translation (Horace, ed. Williams 142).  <Back>

33. Horace, ed. Williams 143.  <Back>

34. Horace, ed. Williams 143.  <Back>

35. Carm. 3.13.3, 3.18.10-11 (cf. Horace, ed. Williams 88, 107).  <Back>

36. Horace, ed. Williams 118.  <Back>


Bibliography

André, Jean-Marie.  LíOtium dans la Vie Morale et Intellectuelle Romaine:  Des Origines à íEpoque Augustéenne.  Paris:  Presses Universitaires de France, 1966.

Bo, Dominicus.  Lexicon Horatianum.  2 vols.  Hildesheim:  Georg Olms, 1965.

Fraenkel, Eduard.  Horace.  Oxford:  Clarendon, 1957.

Horace.  Carminum Libri IV, Epodon Liber.  Ed. T. E. Page.  London:  Macmillan, 1895.

---.  The Odes, Carmen Seculare and Epodes.  Ed.  E. C. Wickham.  Oxford:  Clarendon, 1887.

---.  The Third Book of Horaceís Odes.  Ed.  Gordon Williams.  Oxford:  Clarendon, 1969.

Kilpatrick, Ross S.  ìFortuna Regum:  A 17th-Century Allegorical Landscape at Queenís  University.î International Journal of the Classical Tradition 3 (Summer 1996):  65-76.

---.  Lecture on Horace, Carm. 3.9.  Watson Hall, Kingston.  6 Oct. 1999.

---.  Lecture on Horace, Carm. 3.29.  Watson Hall, Kingston.  5 Nov. 1999.

---.  Lecture on Horace, Carm. 3.29.  Watson Hall, Kingston.  8 Nov. 1999.

Santirocco, Matthew S.   Unity and Design in Horaceís Odes.  Chapel Hill:  University of North  Carolina Press, 1986.

Tripp, Edward.  The Meridian Handbook of Classical Mythology.  New York:  Meridian, 1970.

 

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